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Abstract 
This dissertation outlines the key characteristics of subsidies of fossil fuels and renewable 
energy sources along with their social, economic and environmental impacts. Furthermore, 
based on a wide international literature, it presents the emerging need for their removal, 
combined with a number of regional case studies with reported reform efforts. Finally, from 
these reforming experiences, strategies for successful reform were developed.   
Katerina Mallousi 
11/12/2015 
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1 Introduction 
In global scale, governments provide some level of support, intervention and 
subsidies to a significant share of the private sector.  Specifically energy subsidies 
have received significant attention over the last years, since their size became 
extremely high. International organizations, such as IEA, IMF, OECD and the World 
Bank, systematically estimate the size of energy consumption and production 
subsidies, along with their social, economical and environmental effects.  
There are specific objectives, upon which governments around the world are based, in 
order to justify financial intervention in the energy sector. Firstly, regarding security 
of supply, subsidies have been used as tools to provide constant and adequate 
domestic supply and promote indigenous fuel production, to aid a country's energy 
independence [1]. Secondly, energy subsidies have been implemented at times, in 
order to ensure improvement of the environment, by means of pollution reduction 
(GHG emissions). Energy subsidies may also take the form of reduced prices, in order 
to stimulate specific economy sectors or segments of the population. In this context, 
implementation of energy subsidies may yield growth and export opportunities in 
energy technology markets and aid towards developing domestic industrial sectors. 
Finally, energy subsidies are frequently used in order to enhance and maintain 
employment, particularly in periods of economic transition [1].  
Despite the fact that energy subsidies have the potential to bring short-term benefits, 
they also bring harmful adverse results in numerous ways; market distortions, 
increasing budget deficit, higher energy consumption, higher CO2 emissions, limited 
investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. These negative consequences 
made clear to the governments how urgent it was to take some decisions concerning 
inefficient energy subsidization.   
At their Summit in September 2009, G20 Leaders committed to ''rationalize and 
terminate in the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful 
consumption'' [2]. Although subsidy reform is a considerably challenging attempt, 
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numerous countries made significant progress in this path, across a wide range of 
sectors.  
The scope of this dissertation is, based on an extensive international literature, to 
highlight:  
 the major characteristics of energy subsidies, such as definitions and types, 
 how and by which organizations they are measured, 
 the estimations of energy subsidies worldwide by fuel and by region, 
 the global picture of renewable energy subsidies, 
  the economic, social and environmental impacts of fossil fuel subsidies, 
 the need for their reform along with the barriers that have to be overcome,  
  reported subsidy reform experiences of the top subsidizers across the world 
 and finally, lessons learned by these experiences which structure a plan for 
potential successful reform.  
12 
 
2 Energy and sustainable development 
A term that has grown to become a guiding principle for public policy is sustainable 
development. However, there are some obstacles to be dealt concerning the 
application of that principle  into practical policies and measures , above all due to the 
complex associations comparing the present's  and future's generations' interests and 
among the three dimensions of sustainable development; the economy, social welfare 
and the environment. Energy is deeply entwined in all three dimensions. It constitutes 
a crucial part for economic and social development, yet the present system damages 
the environment in numerous ways. The way in which we generate, transport and 
consume energy is thereupon essential to the long-term sustainability of human 
development [3]. 
2.1 Defining sustainable development 
What is the meaning of sustainable development? There is no unanimity on a precise 
definition. In general, it is about the long-term orchestrated harmony between the 
economic, social and environmental dimensions of the human welfare. The 1987 
Brundtland Report [4], which triggered the process of integrating sustainability in 
economic policy-making , delineated sustainable development as '...development that 
satisfies the needs of the present without putting in danger the ability of future 
generations to make do'. In a less sophisticated way, it can be considered as long-
lasting development.  
No matter what the strict definition is, accomplishing sustainable development needs 
to entail the balancing of the interests of present and future generations. The activities 
of the current generation influence, unavoidably, the assets and resources of future 
generations. The imprudent inquiry of economic growth nowadays can leave our 
children with a greater legacy of economic assets, but with a serious diminishing in 
environmental resources nonetheless.    
Fulfilling present needs additionally includes possible trade-offs in the short term 
between economic, social and environmental aims. Boosting the poor’s living 
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standards can cause considerable short-term economic expenses and the risk of raised 
pollution. Thus, the essential aim of sustainable development is the both the equality 
of economic growth as well as its quantity [3]. 
2.2 Energy's role in sustainable development 
What has a significant impact on sustainability is the way we generate, transport and 
use energy. Even though specific types of energy supply and consumption are able to 
downgrade the environment, energy plays an indispensable role in economic growth. 
Energy provides assistance to fulfill fundamental human needs like production of 
food, the provision of shelter and access to health services, while at the same time 
bestowing to social development by making education accessible [3]. The absence of 
access to trustworthy and reasonably priced energy compromises economic and social 
development in several parts of the world today. In Figure 1, the share of the 
population with access to electricity and clean cooking, is depicted; in IEA’s New 
Policies Scenario, population without access to electricity declines to 810 million in 
2030 and 550 million in 2040 [5].  
 
           Figure 1: Share of population with access to electricity and clean cooking 
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At the same time, the aftermaths of energy generation and utilization around globe are 
posing a threat to the stability of ecosystems and the health as well as the welfare of 
present and future generations. By burning fossil fuels, urban smog and acid rain are 
being caused, whilst producing them can poison water supplies. In multiple towns and 
cities, local pollution caused by oil, gas and coal burning in houses, factories, cars and 
power stations compose an important human health problem. While the World Health 
Organization guideline levels are specific, in big cities of developing countries, the 
concentrations of the most common local air pollutants such as particulates, sulphur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides are way beyond those levels. Another major problem in 
various places around the globe is the acidification of lake and soils [3].  
Additionally to local and broader pollution, increasing fossil-fuel usage in every 
region bears the long-term risk of disturbing climate resulting from the discharges of 
greenhouse gases that trap heat in Earth's atmosphere. It is appraised by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that if the emissions of these 
gases (such as carbon dioxide from energy usage) are not reduced, the inflation in 
concentrations will cause an uncommon rise in global temperatures of about 1.4-5.8 
o
C by 2100, thus leading to sea levels rise and thorough alternations in weather 
patterns [6].  
However, fossil fuels are not the only threat posed to the environment. The generation 
of nuclear power accelerates the production of radioactive waste, thereupon rising the 
risks of contamination. Also the production of specific forms of renewable energy can 
likewise bear significant environmental aftereffects, like the ecological outcomes of 
hydroelectric dams. 
2.3 Public policies and the energy sector 
The lack of proactive government policies and measures will have as a result for the 
energy sector to proceed with developing in conflicting ways compared to sustainable 
development. If resolute action is not taken, primary energy usage has been 
considered to increase steadily over the next two decades [5]. The International 
Energy Agency calculates the expansion of global energy consumption by more than 
half in the next fifteen years, considering no new government policies and measures 
are received. Fossil fuels will fulfill about 80% of the growth in energy needs over 
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this period. Developing countries, such as China and India are where most of the 
cumulative demand will take place.  
The specific trends indicate the extension of the availability of energy services to 
households and productive activities in developing countries, thus aiding the 
improvement of employment opportunities, living conditions and comfort levels of 
poor people. However, they also signify further and worse pollution problems as well 
as a vast inflation in airborne emissions of carbon dioxide. The IEA also calculates 
and average growth of 2.1% per year in carbon dioxide emissions over 2020 [5].  
Consequently, working towards energy sustainability needs a dramatic change in 
current trends. In order to carry this out is only by one or more of the succeeding 
ways, in which expense and practicality are at odds [3]: 
 Boosting the energy effectiveness of output in order to generate the exact same 
amount of products and services with less energy. 
 Preserving energy. For the most elegant way to use energy is not to use it at 
all. 
 Replacing fossil fuels with other that emit less or no noxious and greenhouse 
gases like renewable energy. 
 Enlarging Earth's forests' capacity to absorb carbon.  
 Apprehending carbon as well as other substances near ignition point before 
they are emitted into the atmosphere. 
Energy sustainability will not spontaneously occur. Governments both as individuals 
and as a group   must bring it to life through appropriate policies and measures, along 
with a range of administrative and market-based interventions.    
The correct way for each country is to consider local market conditions, the structure 
of the energy sector, patterns of energy utility, institutional characteristics and altering 
conditions. However, an extensive unanimity exists, underlining the need for an 
approach that benefits efficient, competitive energy markets as the foundation upon 
which government policies and measures should be covered. Figuring market signals 
out so that prices better mirror the true expenses of generating and consuming energy, 
bearing in mind the environmental and social aftereffects, ought to be a key guiding 
ethic in all cases, thus diminishing the economic costs of achieving sustainable 
development aims [3].   
16 
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3 Defining, Measuring and Estimating 
Energy Subsidies 
 
3.1 Defining Subsidies 
The word "subsidy" dates back to Latin times, stemming from the word "subsidium", 
which means support/assistance/aid, whereas, during the middle ages, subsidy 
essentially referred to a payment made to the king [7]. 
Finding a generally accepted definition of subsidies is proven to be a major challenge. 
The most widely used definition is a direct cash payment, made by a government to 
an energy producer or consumer. Other, less narrow definitions, try to depict more 
types of government interventions, which affect prices/costs, directly or indirectly. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) established the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ACMS), which provided a definition of “subsidy”, that is 
commonly accepted by all WTO members. 
Article 1 of the Agreement [8] states that a "subsidy" exists when there is a "financial 
contribution by a government or public body within the territory of the Member". 
According to Article 1 "financial contribution" arises where:  
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, 
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities 
(e.g. loan guarantees);  
(ii) a government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected 
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);  
(iii)  a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, 
or purchases goods; or  
(iv)  a government entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of 
the above functions. A "benefit" is conferred when the "financial 
contribution" is provided to the recipient on terms that are more favorable 
than those that the recipient could have obtained from the market.  
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3.2 Types of Energy Subsidies 
The most frequent differentiation of energy subsidies is between producer and 
consumer subsidies and whether they promote conventional or renewable forms of 
energy. Subsidies can be further categorized into direct transfers, such as grants to 
producers, or indirect transfers, such as regulations for public research and 
development activities [9,10]. The way a government makes the choice for 
subsidizing energy, is subject to several factors, such as overall cost, transaction and 
administrative costs, impacts on society. Table 1 provides a summary of the most 
common types of energy subsidies.  
In addition to the above, consumption subsidies are provided through price controls 
which attempt to regulate the consumers’ cost, direct fiscal transfers, schemes which 
give the consumers purchase reductions of energy products and tax relief. 
Governments frequently intervene by regulate or directly subsidize domestic prices. 
Even so, in many cases, supporting energy consumption through direct fiscal transfers 
does not change the market price of fuels or electricity. This form of financial transfer 
is observed in developing economies, through a fuel voucher which provides the low-
income consumers to receive fuel at lower prices. In more developed countries, this 
kind of transfers include grants for heating for low-income consumers, and moreover, 
support is being provided to specific sectors, such as agriculture, in order to meet the 
fuel expenditures, in the case of sudden rise of prices [9]. 
Governmental support is also provided to energy production: interventions in 
affecting market prices and costs, direct financial transfers, risk assumptions, tax 
reductions, avoiding the use of public goods or assets. In many cases, a combination 
of support mechanisms is being used [10]. For instance, a government can finance 
research on converting coal into liquid transport fuel, give grants and loan guarantees 
for investing in this project, give tax credit for the production and provide the 
producers with exemption of royalties payments for using state-owned land for 
extraction of coal. 
In industrialized countries, tax expenditures related to energy production, are often 
treated favorably for capital or intermediate inputs. This can lead to higher production 
levels than the market would demand otherwise. An example of large indirect subsidy 
can be implied in the case of capital investment, where under some special rules, 
19 
 
businesses are allowed to deduct depreciation of their equipment faster than it actually 
loses its value [10].  
 
 
Table 1: Types of energy subsidies  
Source: IEA, OECD and the World Bank, 2010 
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Governments, in order to promote larger production through lower costs, offer the 
exploitation of scarce resources under their control. Providing access to resources of 
fossil fuels to a private company for its own exploitation or for sale is such a case of 
indirect subsidies [9]. 
Risk transfers to governments include cases of concessional loans and security 
guarantees, but their transparency is often questioned even in industrialized countries. 
Transfers of environmental and health liabilities from producers to public are of equal 
importance and usually lead to governments act like last resort.  
Investing in research and development area (R&D), is another field of governmental 
involvement.  Table 2 includes statistics on energy technology R&D for several IEA 
countries [11]. 
 
Product Total RD&D in Million USD (2014 prices and exch. rates) 
Time 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Country           
Australia   36.88 43.995 39.438 125.074 90.585 65.405 64.687 20.401 
Canada   84.808 86.196 137.328 141.288 127.033 121.096 123.377 99.182 
Czech Republic   0 10.924 11.831 5.852 7.301 8.432 8.897 3.602 
Denmark   20.125 18.793 9.82 35.545 26.964 32.095 46.156 58.688 
Germany   35.671 58.818 145.211 181.926 184.049 213.167 246.81 248.346 
Japan   447.737 425.525 338.161 253.745 280.936 311.123 393.763 476.617 
New Zealand  1.502 1.45 1.075 1.046 1.119 1.125 1.323 2.017 
Norway  6.674 6.032 24.741 34.549 32.533 35.723 70.103 292.534 
Sweden  56.79 53.835 94.021 75.906 72.568 84.021 88.704 83.528 
Switzerland  28.203 33.185 37.866 41.893 53.638 63.55 73.343 79.167 
United States  610.796 724.055 2302.416 1491.036 925.614 994.353 1283.527 1256.042 
Table 2: Energy technology R&D investment  
Source: OECD Library 
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Subsidies for production of fossil fuels exist in numerous countries around the world. 
However, these subsidies are far more nontransparent that those for consumption and 
according to [12], “they take the form of preferential treatment for:  
1. Selected companies, i.e. oil companies 
2. One domestic sector or product 
3. Sectors or products in one country when compared internationally.” 
The most usual producer subsidies are in the form of foregone government revenues 
(reduced VAT for goods/services), allowances for accelerated depreciation and lower 
royalty payments [12]. The Global Subsidies Initiative estimated that producer 
subsidies are likely to be at least USD 100 billion annually, although it is difficult to 
have a clear picture of their size. Taking specific country-level cases, GSI estimated 
producer subsidies in developing and emerging countries range from USD 80 to 285 
billion per year [13]. For advanced economies, producer subsidies have been 
estimated by OECD [14]; IEA does not measure production subsidies.  
 
3.3 Objectives for Subsidies 
  
The rationale for introducing energy subsidies has been to serve economic, social, 
political as well as environmental purposes or to deal with problems in the way 
markets work. The main objectives for the introduction of energy subsidies include 
[9]: 
 Alleviation of energy poverty: The purpose of introducing consumption 
subsidies has been to make the living conditions of the poor better, by 
facilitating the cost and access to cleaner and more efficient fuels. 
 Supporting domestic energy supply: Production subsidies have been used in 
order to diminish import dependency and thus, promote domestic fuel 
production. 
 Encouraging industrial development and employment: Energy subsidies to 
industrial sector support investments in energy-intensive industries by 
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providing a competitive advantage. In addition, regional employment is often 
maintained by production subsidies, in the forms of tariffs or trade restrictions. 
 Reallocating national resource wealth: Consumption subsidies, which 
artificially reduce energy prices, are usually considered as a way of 
distributing the domestic resource wealth. 
 Environmental Protection: Support mechanisms for renewable energy 
sources, nuclear power and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies are 
being established by the majority of developed countries along with some 
emerging economies. Providing incentives to combine “green” technologies 
with market competitiveness has proven to be effective in reducing GHG 
emissions and pollution. 
 
The objectives of subsidies have a wide variety by country and generation type. Table 
3 summarizes the main rationale [15].  
 
 
Table 3: The objectives of subsidies 
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3.4 Measuring Subsidies 
 
3.4.1 THE IEA 
The International Energy Agency defines an energy subsidy as "any government 
action directed primarily at the energy sector that lowers the cost of energy 
production, raises the price received by energy producers or lowers the price paid by 
energy consumers" [IEA, 2014]. The IEA uses the price-gap approach in order to 
measure fossil fuels consumption subsidies. This approach “examines difference 
between the observed price for a good or service in the economy (reference price), 
against the price paid by end-users” [16].  In the case the difference is positive, this 
means that the particular fuel is subsidized. For net importers, the reference price is 
calculated based on the import parity price; the price of the fuel at the nearest 
international hub, including transportation and distribution costs with any value-added 
tax (VAT). For exporters, it equals the export parity price; the price of the fuel at the 
nearest international hub, subtracting the transportation and distribution costs and 
VAT. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and many 
energy exporting countries support that the reference price should not be the 
international market price, but the production cost of the fuel [17].  Their position 
probably stems from the fact that they do not sell cost (to domestic users) while the 
IEA uses the “opportunity” cost approach. 
 
3.4.2 THE OECD 
The OECD defines a subsidy as "any measure that keeps prices for consumers below 
market levels, or for producers above market levels or that reduces costs for 
consumers or producers" [OECD, 2005]. Although this definition is similar with 
IEA’s, a different approach is being used by the OECD for the estimation of 
consumption and production subsidies; only fossil fuel subsidies that are explicitly 
included in the government budget are measured [17]. The approach which is being 
used by the OECD in order to identify different subsidy delivery mechanisms and 
quantify them, is called inventory approach [18].  
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3.4.3 THE IMF 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) categorizes energy subsidies to producer’s 
and consumer’s.  According to IMF’s working paper on Global Energy Subsidies 
[19], "Consumer subsidies arise when the prices paid by consumers, including 
intermediate and final consumption (households), are below the international market 
price (benchmark price), taking into account transportation and distribution costs. On 
the other hand, producer subsidies arise when prices are above this level." For 
internationally traded products, the benchmark price equals the international market 
price, while for non-internationally traded products it equals the domestic production 
cost.  
A further distinction between consumption subsidies, made by IMF, is pre-tax and 
post-tax consumption subsidies. Pre-tax subsidies are defined as the difference 
between the consumer’s supply costs (benchmark price) and the price paid by the 
consumer. In the case of post-tax subsidies, the benchmark price equals the supply 
costs plus a tax subsidy (Pigouvian tax) [17,19].  Tax subsidy reflects the external 
costs that the consumption of the fossil fuel generates to the society, such as pollution, 
health effects, and environmental costs. The imposition of this tax is required in the 
case of a not well-functioning market, which skips the addition of these externalities 
to the price paid by the consumers. In the case of coal for example, which is the most 
polluting fossil fuel, these negative externalities are largely affecting post-tax 
subsidization. Pre-tax subsidies are mostly phased-out in the developed countries, 
while are still being used in the developing ones. Figure 2 below depicts all these 
notions of a subsidy for a single energy product. The efficient price of an energy 
product includes the supply cost, the Pigouvian tax and a consumption tax, which 
reflects the need to tax all consumption to raise revenues. Post-tax subsidy is 
calculated as energy consumption multiplied by the gap between efficient and retail 
prices (the sum of black and grey rectangles).  
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Figure 2: IMF’s approach on pre-tax and post-tax subsidy 
 
3.4.4 The price-gap approach 
The goal of studies conducted, concerning this approach, is to quantify considerable 
deviations in energy prices between a country and the global prices of those wares 
[16]. This approach is considered more beneficial compared to other subsidy 
valuation methods seeing its relative simplicity.  Instead of having to analyze 
numerous policies affiliated with energy in specific countries, analysts are able to 
concentrate on market-clearing prices and a number of adjustments to enhance the 
comparability of the pricing data. This simplification is of greater importance in 
countries that are incapable or unwilling to provide precise information on energy-
related government activities. 
Despite the fact that the price-gap approach is relatively simple, its calculations show 
many boundaries concerning both their accuracy as well as their usage. These 
boundaries derive from two different main sources: challenges in estimating the input 
data which is used in order to calculate a precise price gap as well as types of 
interventions or market effects which cannot be comprehended by this analytic tool 
[16]. 
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3.4.5 The inventory approach 
This approach's purpose is to pinpoint, document and quantify a broad range of 
government interventions in energy markets, employing a mix of support delivery 
mechanisms. The objective of an inventory approach is binary: assisting government 
officials and citizens make out the generic scale of public expenses and policies 
promoting specific energy paths, and help pointing out the most substantial leverage 
point for redeem [18]. 
 
3.4.6 Comparing the different methodologies 
The IMF approach is one of a kind, as it considers the counterproductive taxation of 
fossil fuels as subsidization. Thereupon, the government's failed attempt to handle a 
market failure (such as the negative external costs connected to fossil fuel 
consumption) is itself a type of subsidization according to the IMF. Financially, this 
approach is the most reasonable as inefficient taxation (whether not taxing fossil fuels 
is enough to control for negative external costs, or taxing energy in an alternate way 
than other consumer products) is merely a hidden subsidization of fossil fuels [19]. 
While the IMF concept of FFS is wider than that of the IEA or the OECD, the IMF 
appraises tend to be higher than those of the other two organizations, mainly due to 
the negative externalities which are included in post-tax subsidies estimations. 
The non-identical types of government interventions are not required from the price-
gap approach (as used by the IEA). On the contrary, it leans on the data of end user 
prices and appraises for reference prices to calculate the price-gap for each fossil fuel 
individually. In order to calculate the total value of fossil fuels subsidies, the above 
data are multiplied by the quantities of the corresponding fuel for the time period that 
is being examined. As mentioned before, the relative simplicity of this approach is 
considered its main advantage [IEA, 2014]. The price-gap approach, in comparison 
with the OECD methodology, does not require to compile information on the different 
types of government interventions or to appraise the value of each intervention. 
However, there are some forms of governmental support which have no impact on the 
price paid by the consumers, such as vouchers to low-income households or R&D 
support. These cases can only be measured by the OECD methodology, while the 
price-gap approach has no application [18]. 
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The IEA estimations of fossil fuel subsidies fluctuate significantly for one year to the 
other, because of the fixed prices regimes employed by numerous countries. When the 
reference price of a fossil fuel increases, while the consumer’s price stays constant, 
subsidies unavoidably increase. For importers, an increase in subsidies leads to an 
increase in the budget deficit, as the country is obliged to spend more for fossil fuels 
imports, whereas the consumers’ price remains the same. On the contrary, for 
exporting countries, this increase results in raising government revenues, although the 
gains for every unit of fuel not exported, are lower than before, due to higher 
international prices [17].  
On the other hand, the fossil fuels subsidies estimates by the OECD are constantly 
explicit, because they depict distinct budgetary expenditures and thus, their direct 
impact on the budget [18]. The subsidies’ estimates by IEA are explicit only in the 
case of importing countries. Importers that merchandise fossil fuels in a domestic 
level, below international market prices, have the obligation to cover the difference 
between import and domestic price, through their budget. For exporters, on the other 
hand, consumer subsidies reflect the opportunity cost of domestic supply with energy 
at prices below international market levels. For this reason, IEA estimates are implicit 
and not included in the budget [17]. 
The estimates of fossil fuel subsidies by the two international organizations (IEA and 
OECD) cannot be directly compared due to the fact that they are complementary:  
 In developed economies, the most appropriate approach is the OECD’s 
inventory, because the budgets of such countries are more transparent and 
fossil fuel prices are not subsidized for the entire population. In addition, there 
are several interventions which cannot be captured by price-gap approach, 
since they are not considered as subsidies. 
 In emerging economies, the price-gap approach is certainly more suitable, 
since the main form of subsidization there, is consumption subsidies. 
Moreover, in numerous cases, these subsidies are implicit and thereupon, 
incapable of being captured by the OEDC’s methodology. [17] 
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3.5 The Global Picture of Subsidies 
The estimation of consumption subsidies by the IEA dates back to 2008 (for reported 
year 2007). The total subsidies varied from US$312 billion in 2009, US$573 billion in 
2012 and to US$548 billion in 2013 (Figure 3) [20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Petroleum 
products accounted for more than 50% of subsidies, except in years 2008-2009.  The 
subsidies’ estimates provide a relatively different picture of global fossil fuel 
subsidies, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, due to the use of the price-gap approach, a 
number of producer subsidies are being skipped, even in the case where the market 
price is not lower. The fact that not all countries are included in the dataset of IEA 
constitutes the second reason for the unreliable results on subsidies. By adding the 
producer subsidies, as well as a larger number of countries, the total estimate of global 
subsidies will be higher, whereas the scale of increase cannot be estimated [25]. 
 
 
Figure 3: Global Energy Subsidies Estimates by fuel type [WEO, 2014] 
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In Figure 4, the world’s largest subsidizers are depicted, with Iran being again the 
world’s number one (USD 84 billion), followed by Saudi Arabia (USD 62 billion) and 
India (USD 46 billion) [24]. IEA identified 40 countries which subsidize fossil fuel 
consumption and their value as percentage of total GDP is measured at market 
exchange rate (MER). In Figure 4 it is observed that the average subsidy share of 
GDP is 5%, which is larger in numerous countries than that of public spending on 
health or education. However, countries with small amount of subsidies in absolute 
terms have a higher subsidy share of GDP. In the same way, the rate of subsidies to 
the international reference price shows a wide variation among countries; the average 
is 23%, while in Venezuela is 93%.  
 
 
Figure 4: World’s largest subsidizers by fuel type [WEO, 2014] 
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Nine out of the 25 countries with the highest value of subsidies are in the MENA 
region (Middle East and North Africa) and all of them are oil and gas exporters, like 
most of the other major subsidizers. However, there are cases of importing countries 
such as India, Indonesia and Pakistan, which continue to subsidize certain fuels for 
social reasons [24].   
Changes in international energy prices along with the introduction of subsidy 
reforming schemes in many countries led to the slight fall of global fossil fuel 
subsidies in 2013, after rising in the previous 2 years [24]. There is a strong 
correlation between subsidies and oil prices, since numerous countries set domestic 
energy prices without regard to international market levels. Inevitably, an increase in 
international prices results in higher subsidization. Changes in energy demand and 
exchange rates are considered additional factors that lead to subsidy estimates’ 
fluctuations from year-to-year.  
The OECD’s approach does not capture all types of subsidies and also does not 
provide estimates for each year for the types that it does capture. In the 2013 
inventory preface, where 2011 estimates are contained, the estimates for the 
individual budgetary measures and tax expenditures in OED countries, ranges from 
US$55 in 2005 to US$90 billion in 2011 [OECD 2013]. Subsidies for natural gas or 
coal are, on average less than for oil and petroleum products. 
The IMF approach provides estimates of subsidies by country as a percentage of both 
GDP and government revenues. The estimates of pre-tax and post-tax global subsidies 
for the period 2011-2013 along with projections for 2014-2015, are presented in 
Figure 5. The projections of pre-tax subsidies are presented to decline to 0.4% of 
global GDP in 2015. Pre-tax subsidies for petroleum products account for 63% of the 
total decline during 2013-2015, while for natural gas 9% and for electricity 28% [19]. 
Τhe most outstanding thing we can observe from Figure 5, is the size of post-tax 
subsidies compared with pre-tax, because in 2011 they were 8 times larger and in 
2015 16 times. Regardless of the reduction in international energy prices, post-tax 
subsidies maintained their high levels; 5.8% of global GDP in 2011, 6.5% in 2013 and 
6.5% in 2015, which is “translated” in $4.2 trillion, $4.9 trillion and $5.3 trillion, 
respectively [19]. 
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Figure 5: Global Energy Subsidies 2011-2015 [IMF, 2015] 
 
According to IMF’s analysis on global fossil fuel subsidies by fuel type [19]: 
 For pre-tax subsidies, in 2013, petroleum products receive the largest 
subsidization (0.34 % of global GDP), then follows electricity (0.23%) and 
natural gas (0.16%); coal percentage is negligible (0.01%). All the above 
estimates are projected to be lower in 2015 (petroleum products 0.17% of 
global GDP). 
 For post-tax subsidies, on the contrary with pre-tax, coal is the major source 
accounting for 3% of global GDP in 2011 and rising to 3.9% in 2015. Second 
come petroleum products with a share of 1.8% in 2015, although oil prices 
have fallen. Natural gas comes next with about one third of petroleum 
subsidies, while it is a relatively cleaner fuel. Lastly, electricity subsidization it 
projected to drop to 0.2% in 2015. 
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In Figure 6, we can observe the breakdown of pre-tax and post-tax subsidies by fuel 
type in years 2011, 2013 and 2015. 
 
 
          Figure 6: Global Energy Subsidies by energy product [IMF, 2015] 
 
 
The following figure depicts the allocation of subsidies by fuel type from the different 
estimates of IEA, OECD and IMF. It provides a more quantified breakdown of the 
estimates of the three international organizations and also, a more detailed picture of 
the fluctuations of these estimates, due to methodological dissimilarities and regions 
examined [17]. 
As we can observe, petroleum products are the major player of subsidization, varying 
from 36 to 70%. The last (OECD’s 70%), seems particularly overestimated, but it is 
explained, as the heavy taxation of fuels in OECD countries leads to any tax reduction 
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or break to be considered as high subsidy. Subsidization of electricity is not included 
in OECD’s analysis; only when it is generated from fossil fuels [17].  
 
 
Figure 7: Subsidies Allocation by fuel type  
Source: Commission’s Economic Brief, 2015 
 
The IEA’s estimates in 2013 are very close to the IMF’s for pre-tax subsidies in 2011, 
because the methodology is similar as well as the countries analyzed [IEA, 2012,   
IMF, 2010]. The negative externalities, which are included in post-tax subsidies, 
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explain the large deviation of these estimates, since coal is the most polluting fuel and 
thus, it is the most heavily subsidized fuel on a post-tax basis. 
Pre-tax subsidies acquire their higher shares in the MENAP region (47% of 
subsidies), where the regulation of petroleum prices most often takes place. Emerging 
and developing Asia accounts for 18%. Several countries in the region, notably 
Pakistan, India, Indonesia and Bangladesh, heavily subsidize the use of fossil fuels, 
especially petroleum. The contribution of advanced countries is, relatively to their 
economic weight, very low; only 4% [17].  
Focusing on post-tax subsidies, the picture is different. In this case, Emerging and 
Developing Asia has the biggest share of subsidies (about 50%), followed by 
advanced countries. MENA region’s share is lower than in pre-tax subsidies case, at 
around 20%. Figure 8 presents the regional allocation of pre-tax and post-tax energy 
subsidies in 2013.  
Figure 8: Regional Allocation of Subsidies [IMF, 2015] 
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Analyzing the above Figure, the following observations are yielded: 
 Advanced countries have the lowest share of post-tax subsidies, when they are 
expressed as a percentage of regional GDP, because GHGs emissions are 
relatively low and energy taxes are high. 
 MENAP region has a rate of about 13% of regional GDP 
 CIS and Emerging and Developing Asia have the highest share of 16-17% of 
regional GDP, which reflects the high rates of coal use and the heavy exposure 
of population to coal’s emissions. 
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4 Renewable Energy Subsidies 
 
4.1 Global Trends in Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy sources are the only form of energy which is naturally 
inexhaustible. We consider as renewable sources: solar power, wind, hydro, biomass, 
geothermal, tidal, ocean and wave energy. Investments in renewable energy sources 
have been moving upwards in recent years.  
Figure 9: Global new investment in Renewable Energy by Asset class (in $BN)  
Source: UNEP, Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
 
As it can be observed from Figure 9, investments in 2014 increased by 17% to $270.2 
billion, compared to 2013. Although this is below the record of $278.8 billion in 
2011, it is more impressive due to the different circumstances; the sharp fall in capital 
costs for wind and solar energy, results in more MW of capacity added for each 
billion dollars [26]. Figure 10 shows another notable feature of last year’s 
investments in RES. The difference between developed and developing countries 
recorded its lowest values; developed countries attracted $138.9 billion and 
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developing $131.3 billion. The highest contribution, for the case of developing 
economies, was from investments in China, which skyrocketed from $3 billion in 
2004 to $83.3 billion in 2014 [26].  
 
  
Figure 10: Global new investment in Renewable Energy: Developed vs. Developing 
countries (in $BN) 
Source: UNEP, Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
Despite this promising performance, RES’ share in global energy systems is still poor. 
In electricity sector, RES attracted investments of $242.5 billion of power generation 
capacity in 2014, translated in 9.1% of global power generation and 15% of global 
power capacity  [Figure 11] [26].  
Considering the significantly larger investments in fossil fuels, these encouraging 
trends concerning RES, are tempered. It is obvious then, that fossil fuels cannot be 
easily threatened by renewable energy. Thus, subsidizing clean energy seems as the 
most effective way to achieve the goals of energy access and climate change 
mitigation.  
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Figure 11: Renewable Energy Generation as a share of Global Power  
Source: UNEP, Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
 
4.2 Arguments for subsidizing renewable energy 
In order to promote renewable energy through subsidies, the following arguments 
exist [27]: 
 The public good argument: the desire to increase energy access and 
recognition of market failures. For instance, rural households are unlikely to 
enjoy energy access unless capital cost is subsidized, due to the not 
economically viable installation of transmission lines and distribution systems 
so far from the electricity grid. These subsidies should not necessarily be 
considered as net governmental costs, because they result in social benefits, 
which could not be included in balance sheets. The environmental and health 
benefits of switching to cleaner energy, along with shifting away from fossil 
fuels and their costs, yield significant social and economic returns. 
Furthermore, the subsidization of new “cleaner” technologies aims to bring the 
costs of renewable technologies closer to the ones of conventional sources. 
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 “Green” jobs argument: the creation of new jobs due to renewable energy is 
established in numerous countries. According to [28], in 2014 7.7 million 
people worked directly or indirectly in RES sector. Table 4 provides a 
detailed picture of jobs in RES sector by country and resource. 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated Direct and Indirect Jobs in Renewable Energy Worldwide by 
Industry, [REN 21, 2015] 
 
 The industrial policy argument: the opportunity for countries to prevail and 
develop new sectors of the economy due to new clean technologies. In the 
early stages of a new sector or firm, the government support is vital for 
multiple reasons; security of access to power markets and grid, risk 
diversification, favorable loans, land and water security. While developing an 
industrial policy, several issues may arise; market distortions, rent-seeking 
behavior, excess capacity added, lock in existing technologies. In order to 
mitigate these adverse effects, an operative policy design is required. 
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 The tit-for-tat argument: if one country provides support to its domestic 
industry and labor force, other countries would react accordingly in order for 
the competition not to be distorted and market opportunities not to be lost.   
Table 5 summarizes the above arguments for subsidizing clean energy, along with 
potential supporters and opponents for each case.  
 
    Table 5: Arguments for subsidizing clean energy [27] 
 
4.3 Support Mechanisms for Renewable Energy Sources 
Up until May 2011, support methods are distinguished into two different types: 
indirect methods (implicit payments, discounts or institutional support tools - e.g. 
R&D funding, provision of infrastructure or services below the benchmarked cost) 
and direct methods, in the form of investment supports (capital grants, tax 
exemptions, price subsidies, etc.). For renewable energy sources, in particular, there 
are direct price-based mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs (FIT), feed-in premiums 
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(FIP) and fiscal incentives and indirect mechanisms, such as preferential tax credits 
and infrastructure support. In addition, quantity-based mechanisms, such as renewable 
portfolio standards (RPS) and competitive auctions, may also be utilized [29]. 
4.3.1 Feed-In Tariffs 
The main purpose of feed-in tariffs is to guarantee a set price for every MWh 
produced by RES generators. In order for a FIT to be attractive to producers, it should 
be high enough, in order for them to recover the costs in the long term. Depending on 
the case and power system, FIT apply for 10 years at minimum, while they may be 
extended for as many as 30 years [29]. As FIT has been applied for a long time, they 
have embodied several rules into their basic concept, namely: 
1. Regulatory agreements/contracts: the FIT often is presented as a commitment 
included in a specific law or decree, or may take the form of a contract, which 
describes the system operator as counter-party. 
2. Flat or stepped tariffs: due to the great variety of RES technologies and RES 
profile characteristics, some governments offer scaled support schemes 
(otherwise termed "stepped tariffs"). More specifically, tariffs may be defined 
according to technology, location or plant size. The purpose of such 
remuneration packages is to minimize the risk of overcompensating efficient 
plants and decrease the cost of support or associated burden for customers. 
This differentiation leads to over-complication of the tariff setting process, and 
to undermine efficiency signals towards market players, as the incentive to 
invest in the most efficient alternatives first is lost. 
3. Constant or decreasing payment stream: The payment stream can be either 
constant throughout the contract period, or a larger payment can be deposited 
in the first years, followed by successive reductions, towards the end of the 
contract period. This measure helps towards mitigating the requirement for 
substantial project finance, as reductions are often proportional to the plant's 
performance.  
4. Tariff degression: according to this measure, the remuneration for generators 
is scheduled to decrease overtime, either at a rate previously agreed, or in 
accordance with the installed capacity. This method is associated with 
fundamental difficulties, as the task of ascertaining the starting point for 
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degression and the degression rate is considered especially daunting. Tariff 
degression, at times, has been the subject of argument against RES, as several 
parties state that it is too expensive, supports are too generous and final 
consumers are over-encumbered with the tariff [29]. Dangers lurk for 
investors as well, in regulatory terms, as, in case of change in the degression 
rates during project development, investors may fail to meet their initial return 
requirements. 
FIT do not expose RES developers to risks associated with price fluctuations in the 
electricity market, but instead the respective remuneration provides them with long-
term certainty [30]. They endorse RES technologies that are on the verge of market 
maturity and furthermore, regulators are imposed a nearly negligible administrative 
burden, while generators wishing to benefit do not have associated regulatory barriers.  
On the other hand, when applying FIT, it proves especially challenging to define the 
correct remuneration levels. As there is asymmetry of information between the two 
parties, there is no way for the regulator to accurately assess the costs of the 
generator. As such, according to [31], FIT may either be too low, thus preventing 
developers from entering the electricity market, or too high, hence resulting in over-
investments at very high costs, which may not correspond to proportional 
technological improvements. In addition, having assured a revenue stream, generators 
lack the incentive to react and adjust their production in the face of market price 
signals. Greece initiated a massive exploitation of solar power, especially during the 
period between 2006 - 2011, which was owed to the very appealing feed-in tariffs 
introduced to the market, especially for rooftop solar PVs. Since this unprecedented 
boom was proved to be unsustainable, this mechanism created a great deficit, thus 
leading to drastic changes, such as temporary taxes and progressive reduction of feed-
in tariffs. Subsequently, new PV projects were put on hold and further development 
has been halted ever since, in conjunction with the severe austerity measures imposed 
in recent years.  
Out of the currently available renewable energy technologies, only biomass and small 
hydro systems with reservoir storage are considered truly dispatchable (i.e. can 
increase production in response to high prices) and operate according to energy price 
signals. However, it seems this is one way to go further, as FiP is one of the 
modalities present in the recent EU Guidelines [European Commission, 2013]. 
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4.3.2 Feed-in premiums 
Feed-in premiums (FIP) constitute guaranteed payments towards generators, on top of 
existing electricity prices. Thus, as stated in [Batle et. al], FIP serve as a kind of 
"renewable" capacity payment. As in the case of FIT, these premiums are set for a 
specific contract period. Their predominant advantage, compared to FIT, is that 
generators do not have to adjust their production subject to price signals. This solves 
the setback previously mentioned for less dispatchable RES, as respective generators 
are still able to find incentives to manage operations, maintenance and forecasting 
more properly. In contrast to FiTs, FIP are associated with significantly higher risks, 
as they are granted on top of market prices, which may be volatile, depending on the 
case. In the worst case scenario, this may lead generators to deviate from generation 
predictions and resort to gaming via the prediction, which may ultimately result in 
inefficient electricity dispatch and in turn higher prices and premiums. Such risks are 
considered impediments by new RES developers and garner a competitive advantage 
to vertically integrated companies (companies that undertake generation and retail 
activities). Consequently, FIP create an incentive for integration of different 
technologies, which may lead to market power problems [29].  
4.3.3 Fiscal Incentives 
According to [Batle et. al], it is very usual for fiscal incentives to complement RES 
support mechanisms. A noteworthy fiscal incentive is the Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (MACRS), implemented by the United States government; this 
system includes an accelerated depreciation schedule over a 5-year period to most 
RES technologies. Other similar incentives entail tax exemptions offered to 
generators on the basis of installed capacity and renewable energy production. When 
such incentives are applied, RES developers can clearly benefit from flexible or 
accelerated depreciation over a specific period, while consumers do not have to bear 
any burdens through increased tariffs and governments incorporate these measures to 
their budget. However, fiscal incentives are only fruitful from an equity aspect, since 
the developers getting the most out of tax credits are those with a large revenue 
stream, able to turn these tax reliefs into cash [30]. Moreover, assuming that the upper 
goal of the measures is to encourage renewable electricity production, regulating 
entities should consider that such incentives may facilitate investment, but might not 
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yield higher production. Finally, fiscal incentives, being a part of the government's 
budget, as stated before, are susceptible to regulatory risks and respective 
adjustments. 
4.3.4 Preferential tax credits 
There are several types of tax credits, such as for consumption, production, 
investment, exports and depreciation. In the case of consumption, tax exceptions can 
promote renewable energy to consumers. Production credits are offered per KWh of 
electricity produced above the guaranteed tariff. This is an incentive for producers to 
generate more, since the amount paid depends on the amount of power produced. 
Export tax concessions can lead to increased exports of RE products and services. 
Finally, accelerated depreciation allows higher depreciation rates on RE assets and 
thus, promotes investments in domestic production capacity [27, 30]. 
4.3.5 Infrastructure Support 
Concerning grid access, regulatory measures are necessary in order to force utilities to 
provide with transmission lines and electricity substations to RE installations which 
are dispersed across locations and otherwise will not be viable. While regulation is 
one route, direct government support for grid infrastructure in another way to make 
costs lower. In addition to grid connection, land acquisition and access to other 
natural resources is another form of infrastructure support, provided by governments 
[27].  
4.3.6 Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Renewable portfolio standards (RPS), otherwise termed tradable green certificates 
(TGC) or renewable obligations (RO), establish a quota regime, under which 
consumers, suppliers and/or generators must comply, by ensuring that a portion of 
their electricity stems from RES [29]. Every unit of electricity produced from RES is 
awarded with tradable certificates, which are then bought by the entities that do not 
meet the quota requirement. Those that surpass their targets are able to sell surplus 
TGCs to the ones that do not meet their obligations.  
This form of regulation promotes renewable energy and reduces the costs of meeting 
targets by creating a market mechanism [27].  [Batle et. al] also suggest that, if 
properly implemented, RPS, along with related quota-based mechanisms, is the most 
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economically efficient support for RES. By defining the target percentage, market 
competition evolves between developers and energy prices are better determined. This 
trading system also enhances the overall efficiency and renders the generators flexible 
to meet government targets. Finally, the trading system is not contained to a mere 
system or geographical limits, but can instead increase the transnational efficiencies. 
.In the case of entities that are unlikely to generate renewable energy, this mechanism 
allows them to purchase energy from producers faraway. The key to success for such 
mechanisms is inevitably, an efficient electricity grid. However, certificate trading 
may cause overinvestment in RES, which would subsequently drop the certificate 
prices and expose market participants [30]. 
4.3.7 Competitive auctions 
 In the case of competitive auctions, governments and regulators set a certain amount 
of RES capacity that must be part of the total inventory, during a specific period. A 
tendering procedure is carried out, in order to grant the lowest bidder a long-term 
contract for renewable electricity production and thus reduce uncertainty for RES 
developers, as well as aid regulators towards meeting their own capacity growth 
objectives [29]. This quantity-based mechanism offers reduced risk for RES 
generators - provided they win the bidding procedure - as remuneration is guaranteed 
and obviously reduced barriers to entry, as well as low administrative and transaction 
costs. In addition, using auctions relieves the regulator from having to identify RES-
related costs, as the bidders are obliged to reveal the appropriate support levels 
through the tendering procedure. As the RES development process is centralized, 
auctions can facilitate economies of scale. Finally, auctions create incentives for 
market players to form partnerships and be successful in building more efficient RES 
projects. The downside of this measure is that regulators must ensure that the RES 
industry has reached a certain level of maturity in order to profit from the bidding 
process and the aforementioned benefits are granted to the winning bidder [29].  
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4.4 The Global Picture of Renewable Energy Subsidies 
According to IEA [WEO 2014], the estimated total value of subsidies to renewable 
energy of all types globally in the year 2013, is $121 billion, 15% higher than in 2012 
(Figure 12), using again the price-gap approach. From the total value of these 
subsidies 20% was for biofuels and the remaining 80% for power generation. The 
level of subsidies to biofuels increased from $20 billion in 2012 to $24 billion, mainly 
due to higher consumption in most countries and a wider price gap between ethanol 
and gasoline in the U.S. The recent development of solar PV and wind, led to 
increased support to renewable power technologies by $11 billion, compared to the 
levels of 2012 [24].  
                 
Figure 12: Changes in global renewables power subsidies [WEO, 2014] 
 
The most important reasons for these year-to-year changes in the amount of subsidies 
are the following [IEA, 2014]: 
 One-time payment programs (grants or investment tax credits) 
 Changes in the wholesale prices or exchange rates 
 Payments that did not fully operate in that year but it came online the 
previous year 
 New capacity 
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Subsidies to power generation from renewables are mainly concentrated in a small 
number of countries. The five leading countries (Germany, U.S., China, Italy and 
Spain) in 2013 accounted for 70% of the total level of subsidies and the top-fifteen 
countries for 90% [WEO, 2014]. As it can be observed in Figure 13, in these 
countries, the biggest share is solar PV (47%), followed by wind power (28%) and 
bioenergy (21%).  
 
 
The New Policies Scenario assumes an increase in subsidies through to 2030, peaking 
at approximately $230 billion (2013 price) attributed to the universal boom of 
renewable energy use, which is projected to decline over the last decade, due to the 
expiry of previously granted subsidies, taking into account the fact that support 
measures chiefly last for 20 years [IEA, 2014]. Going further beyond this period, 
2040 estimations reach $205 billion. The main contributing factors to the increase in 
subsidy costs are the declining unit costs and competitiveness, which rises 
Figure 13: Renewable power subsidies in the top 15-countries, by source [WEO, 2014] 
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proportionately to the wholesale prices in most regions. During this period, 
approximately 20% (1 out of $5.4 trillion in total) of the cumulative renewable energy 
subsidies are forecast to be directed to biofuels. Renewable energy subsidies in 2040 
are expected to have risen over 40% from current levels, amassing $35 billion per 
year. Yearly subsidies for RES-based power generation, having previously peaked at 
$186 billion in 2030, are seen to reach almost $170 billion by 2040. Throughout the 
most part of the projection period, solar PV's take the lion's share of subsidies, until 
they are eventually overtaken by bioenergy for power [Figure 14]. Concerning 
onshore wind power, respective subsidies reach an apex shortly before 2020 and 
display a steady decline onwards, since onshore wind starts to compete against 
conventional power plants in several locations. On the contrary, CSP and offshore 
wind subsidies record an abrupt rise, namely from the current 4% to 40% of the total 
subsidies to renewables in the power sector in 2040 [24].  
 
 
  
Figure 14: Global Renewables Subsidies by source (New Policies Scenario, WEO 2014) 
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The pattern of renewable energy subsidies differs between regions. Currently, the EU 
takes up the most part of the total subsidies, accounting for $69 billion (57%). 
According to [IEA, 2014], EU subsidies are expected to grow until 2020, at around 
$80 million. By 2040, renewables subsidies drop below 50%, mainly due to the expiry 
of previously granted subsidies to the multitude of solar PV [Figure 15]. On the other 
hand, the US support reached $27 billion in 2013, a figure which is expected to 
increase further, by some 50%, to clinch $40 billion during the early 2030s and reduce 
to $36 billion by 2040. The EU provides the largest financial support of renewables 
over this period, while the US comes second after 2035, due to the rapid decrease of 
subsidies to power generation technologies in the EU and the larger subsidies 
assigned to biofuels in the United States. In a similar manner as with the US, 
subsidies to renewable technologies in China and Japan display a peak at $30 billion 
and $19 billion respectively around 2030. By 2040, the aforementioned regions 
combined account for just over 50% of global subsidies, as subsidies to India and the 
rest of the world continue to grow [24]. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 15: Regional allocation of global renewables subsidies (New Policies Scenario, WEO 2014) 
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5 Effects of Subsidies 
5.1 Economic Effects of Subsidies 
A subsidy naturally entails a complicated set of alternations in economic resource 
allocation, in spite of its effectiveness on expenses or prices. These moves 
unavoidably bear economic, social and environmental effects. Quantifying all these 
diverse consequences is achingly difficult and criticized. This is made clear 
particularly while measuring the social and environmental benefits. Nonetheless, 
many examples exist from various countries and regions of the elevated economic 
costs affiliated with energy subsidies. In numerous cases, the costs connected to 
energy subsidies are possible to overshadow any generic social and environmental 
benefits that could possibly augment from those subsidies, which may often be 
accomplished in a more efficient way and at lower expense in means that do not entail 
subsidizing energy. The loss of economic effectiveness, which depends on the form of 
subsidy, is displayed in one or more of the following ways [UNEP, 2008]: 
 Subsidizing consumption or production, by reducing end-use prices, leads 
to increased amount of energy used and diminish motivations to preserve 
or utilize energy in more efficient ways. 
 Lowering the price taken by producers, a consumption subsidy can 
possibly sabotage energy providers' return on investment and thus, they are 
not being able and motivated to invest in new infrastructure. Subsequently, 
it can embolden dependence on obsolete and dirty technology. The 
menacing financial crisis of energy companies and the arising under-
investment in numerous developing countries, like the state electricity 
boards in India, are mainly by reason of under-pricing and poor collection 
rates.  
 Direct subsidies in the form of grants or tax exceptions serve as an exhaust 
on government finances. Direct subsidies like these can result in keen 
pressure on the government budget, particularly throughout periods of 
increasing international prices. 
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 Physical deficiency and a need for administratively costly rationing plans 
may be the result of price caps or ceilings under market-clearing levels.  
 Consumption subsidies would rise demand for imports or lower the 
amount of energy accessible to export, if energy usage was to be increased. 
This damages the balance of payments and security of supply by 
expanding the country's dependence on imports. 
 Subsidies to certain energy technologies unavoidably sabotage the 
progress and commercialization of different technologies that could 
possibly become both more economically as well as environmentally 
appealing. In this manner, subsidies are able to ''lock-in'' technologies to 
the rejection of other, more upcoming ones. Some of these soaring 
expenses are eventually carried at best in part by the predetermined 
beneficiaries of the subsidies in addition to the rest of the society. Also, 
not all of these expenses vanish at once with the removal of subsidies 
because it can take a while to restore the stock of energy-related equipment 
utilized in supply and end-use.  
 Finally, the over-subsidization of certain RES technologies (especially 
solar PV) observed in several EU countries resulted in significant 
economic loss of consumers. 
 
5.2 Social Effects of Subsidies 
The social importance of energy subsidies differ in accordance with the type of 
subsidy. Subsidies to contemporary cooking and heating fuels like kerosene, liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) and natural gas, plus electricity are ordinary in developing 
countries. Their goal is to enhance poor households' living circumstances by making 
those fuels more available and economically attractive [IMF, 2015]. 
Those subsidies can prove to bear significant benefits to poor communities, where 
they result in shifting from traditional fuels and in enhanced access to electricity. 
These involve fewer indoor pollution and a diminish in the time women and children 
put in gathering fuel and, thus more  time for constructive actions such as farming, 
and education. In real life though, these subsidies often aid primarily the energy 
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companies, equipment suppliers and the households that are in a more advantageous 
position, notably in the towns and cities [UNEP]. There are even cases, where they 
possibly do not influence the poor at all. Subsequently, several energy subsidy 
programs designed to increase poor households' purchasing power or rural 
communities’ access to contemporary energy throughout decreased prices can, 
prodigiously, leave the poor in a worse condition, since the expenses are proportioned 
equally amongst the entire population including the poor [10]. 
Three prime reasons exist for this:  
 The households that live below poverty line may not be able to make do even 
with subsidized energy or can possibly have no physical access to it, like when 
a rural community is not connected to the electricity grid.  
 Supposing the poor can benefit from an energy subsidy, the financial profit to 
them may be meager considering their consumption is in most cases humble. 
On the other hand, rich households have the tendency to benefit a lot more in 
nominal circumstances since they consume more of the subsidized fuel. 
 Consumption subsidies can lead to a need for being divided into portions, 
when price caps are involved. Middle and higher income households have the 
tendency to obtain the main part of subsidized energy in countries it is 
rationed in, over insignificant corruption and favoritism. Furthermore, price 
caps embolden subsidized household fuels like kerosene, to be altered to 
whether the black marker or other utilities, such as transport. 
The interests of people living below the poverty line can be harmed by subsidies in 
different ways, too. In essence, energy subsidies regularly go to vast capital-intensive 
projects like hydroelectric dams with the loss of local, small-scale labor-intensive 
possible choices, such as biomass digesters. The manufacturing of dams often include 
displacing communities, despite the fact that the enhanced availability of electric 
power as well as water for irrigation can bear significant social benefits.  Subsidies to 
large-scale thermal power plants, oil refineries and gas converting plants have an 
impact on poor households nearly to those facilities most, since they are most likely 
less able to move away to avoid local pollution and safety dangers [OECD, 2013].  
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Additionally, subsidies are able to dislocate growth-enhancing public expending. 
Some countries consume more on energy subsidies that on public health and 
education. Redistributing a number of the resources freed by subsidy improve to more 
constructive public spending which could assist in boosting growth long-term [9, 10]. 
5.3 Environmental Effects of Subsidies 
 
The environmental aftermaths of energy subsidies are particularly complex, meaning 
they can either be positive or negative depending on the exact nature of the subsidy 
and energy source. Subsidies whose outcome is a decreased price to end-users usually 
increase the consumption of the specific fuels, thus inevitably damaging the 
environment, including higher airborne discharges of noxious and greenhouse gases. 
Larger fossil-fuel production can further harm the environment directly by 
contaminating water supplies and spoiling the landscape. Subsidies for biofuels, 
utilized by numerous OECD countries, often bring about more intensive farming. As a 
result, fertilizers and pesticides are further used, thus harming the local eco-systems 
and raising both solid and water contamination [OECD, 2013].  
Nonetheless, there can be cases in which subsidizing modern energy use could 
actually bear some environmental benefits. For instance, emboldening the usage of oil 
products can limit deforestation in developing countries as poor rural and peri-urban 
households stop firewood usage.  This can subsequently augment carbon sinks and 
possibly offset the emissions from fuel combustion. Furthermore, subsidies 
concerning oil products and electricity in poor countries are able to decrease indoor 
pollution by emboldening inhabitants to turn their backs to traditional energies such as 
wood, straw, crop residues and dung [UNEP, 2008].  
Subsidies to domestic fossil-fuel production do not methodically lead to greater 
consumption if they result in an alteration from imported to domestically generated 
fuel on a one-for-one basis. This has been highly debated to defend coal-production 
subsidies in Germany because they cover the dissimilarity between actual production 
expenses and import prices [32]. It has been indicated that they do not include 
reduced prices, thus greater consumption. However, the financial and economic 
damage of keeping incompetent mines open can be very high. The money that have 
been saved by putting an end to such subsidies would be better spent on efforts to 
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popularize energy efficiency or renewables, which could lead to decreased emissions 
on the long run [9].  
The key to deciding whether a subsidy is good or bad for mitigating climate change is 
whether the energy source it supports is more or less carbon-intensive than the 
alternative. Several experimental studies contribute strong evidence that the large 
subsidies to fossil fuel consumption worldwide in place today add to greater 
greenhouse-gas emissions and aggravate climate change [33]. 
Subsidies that support renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies could 
prove being helpful in reducing noxious and greenhouse-gas emissions depending on 
how they are structured as well as on dominant market conditions [UNEP, 2008]. In 
some cases, subsidies to renewables have to be large in order to make those 
technologies competitive with subsidies already existing based on fossil-fuels. If 
fossil fuels are replaced from renewable energy and the amount of fossil fuel-based 
energy consumed in building plants and equipment is lower than expected, then the 
net effect on emissions shall broadly be positive. Nonetheless, some types of 
renewables can also have detrimental environmental consequences, like damaging the 
aesthetic impact on the landscape and when it comes to biofuels, chemical fertilizers 
are over-used. The permanent impact on emissions of public funding of energy-
related research and evolution of renewables is deeply variable and uncertain, 
depending on whether it produces commercially viable technology [34].  
 
56 
 
  
57 
 
6 Reforming Fossil fuel subsidies 
 
6.1 Grounds for subsidy reform 
At their Summit in September 2009, G20 Leaders committed to ''rationalize and 
terminate in the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful 
consumption'' [2].  This was decided after a combined analysis by the OECD and the 
IEA demonstrating that the removal of fossil fuel subsidies in a number of non-OECD 
countries would actually diminish world Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 10% 
in 2050 compared with their level without reforming [35]. 
Many acknowledge the discharge of fossil-fuel subsidies to be a win-win policy 
measure that would aid the global economy as well as the environment, resulting in a 
''no regret'' option for climate-change mitigation [36]. Theoretically, excluding fossil-
fuel subsidies would bear consequences such as higher fossil-fuel prices in countries 
which presently subsidize consumer prices, which could lessen the consumption and 
therefore GHG emissions.  Simultaneously, removing subsidies would discard a 
pricey drain on the government budget. Therefore, disposing of subsidies to fossil 
fuels can be one of the most cost-effective and least misinterpreted options accessible 
to governments for lessening their GHG emissions [36]. 
Nevertheless, governments envisaging fossil-fuel subsidy reform should carefully 
appraise the environmental and economic benefits of doing so. It is feasible that 
reform could incite some unforeseen negative environmental consequences. In a few 
poorer countries, for instance, the unexpected removal of subsidies for cooking fuels 
could cause a reliance on biomass for cooking and heat in several areas, thus rising 
pressure on forests and unfavorably affecting indoor air quality. Also, on a global 
scale, subsidy phasing out could lead to a downward pressure on global price of fossil 
fuels, thus increasing consumption in regions not subject to a cap on GHG emissions 
[37]. 
Moreover, there is unease that removing subsidy could bear unfortunate social 
consequences, or that the social benefits may not prove being reasonably apportioned. 
[Pearce et al., 2003] notice that, naturally, subsidies divert economic rents to specific 
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stakeholders. Accordingly, subsidy removal would be able, temporarily, to form some 
economic losers. The International Energy Agency [21] indicates that even if some 
losers from subsidy reform exist, solutions that augment general net economic and 
environmental welfare should still be applied, and efforts to reimburse the losers 
considered. Transfers or social programs that are more appropriately targeted for the 
poor, is where the money that have been saved from subsidies could, theoretically, 
wind up.  
Another crucial factor is the timing and speed of reform. It is possible that fossil-fuel 
subsidy reform will prove being challenging for several countries, taking into 
consideration the various economic, environmental and social changes reform could 
accelerate [37]. Appraising the nature and scale of the specific modifications is 
consequently important to determining the costs and benefits of subsidy reforms and 
to pinpointing what bordering measures may be necessary to guarantee that negative 
effects are diminished.  
The removal or reform of energy subsidies in the situation of a step to more 
sustainable advancement policies does not suggest the forsaking of social policy aims. 
Generally, they can be accomplished in a more effective way through different 
mechanisms containing direct welfare payments or investments in social services, 
considering the economic efficiency losses and environmental effects being less 
marked. It is frequently better for a government to commit straight to the expense of 
building or operating a school or hospital than to subsidize the electricity or heating 
fuels necessary to operate them [39].  
 
6.2 Implications of phasing-out fossil fuel subsidies 
According to IEA [21], the complete phase-out of consumption subsidies would result 
in 5,8% less energy demand, or 738 Mtoe, by 2020 [Figure 16], compared to a 
baseline where no removal of subsidies occurred. Reducing consumption subsidies 
would eliminate dependence on imports and as a result the fiscal position of many 
countries would be improved. Additionally, this would lead to less volatile global 
markets, since consumers would be exposed to market-driven price signals and thus, 
to stronger demand response. The phase-out of energy subsidies would ameliorate 
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energy security by delaying the depletion of fossil fuel resources and promoting the 
diversification of energy mix [40]. 
 
 
       Figure 16: Impact of subsidy phase-out on global energy demand by 2020  
       [IEA,2011] 
 
In Figure 17, the result of global subsidy phase-out in oil demand is depicted. 
Specifically, the reduction of oil demand is 6.5 mb/d by 2020. 
 
                 Figure 17: Oil savings from subsidy removal, by 2020 [IEA, 2011] 
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As far as CO2 emissions are concerned, the complete phase-out of subsidies would 
result in 10.92% reduction [34], by 2020, compared to a baseline where subsidies 
remain unchanged. This reduction in CO2 emissions is equivalent to the current 
emissions of Germany, Italy and France combined [OECD database].   
Concerning carbon pricing, 13% of global CO2 emissions are currently being 
subsidized by USD 115 per tone while only 11% are subject to a carbon price, with an 
average cost of only USD 7 per tone of CO2 [IEA, 2014]. If a small amount of the 
savings from subsidy reform (30%) is reinvested in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, emissions reductions could be increased to 18.5% [Figure 18]. 
According to IEA estimates [IEA, 2014], consumption subsidies in 2013 were more 
than four times the level of investment in low-carbon technologies and energy 
efficiency. By removing fossil fuel subsidies, the payback period of such investments 
can be substantially decreased. The phase-out of these inefficient subsidies would 
play a significant role in addressing climate change and implementing the 
commitments of the G-20 [40]. 
 
Figure 18: Average emissions reductions from subsidy removal across 20 countries [NCM, 2015]  
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6.3 Barriers to Reform 
A recent report of the International Monetary Fund [41] pointed out the main 
obstacles that must be overcome, in order to achieve a successful subsidy reform.  
 
1. Inadequacy of information concerning the magnitude and flaws of 
subsidies 
The total cost of energy subsidies, involving both producer as well as consumer 
subsidies, are barely demonstrated in the budget. This is particularly the case for oil 
exporters recorded in the budget. Populations are often ignorant of how domestic 
energy prices are set compared with global levels, the aftermath of low energy prices 
for both the budget as well as economic adaptability, and the benefit allocation of 
energy subsidies. Correspondingly, the public is incapable of building a connection 
between subsidies, restrictions on broadening high-priority public spending, as well as 
the disadvantageous aftereffects of subsidies on economic evolution and poverty 
alleviation. This is particularly significant for oil exporters due to the size of their 
subsidies.  
2. Absence of government reliability and administrative capacity 
Despite the fact that the public recognizes the significance and drawbacks of energy 
subsidies, it regularly has little determination that the government will actually utilize 
savings from subsidy reform prudently. This is notably valid in countries with a 
history of extensive corruption, absence of integrity in the force of public policy and 
distinguished inefficiencies in public spending. The middle class may boldly resist the 
phase-out of these subsidies because they are considered as one of the few solid 
benefits they gain from the state. This is exceptionally the case for oil exporters that 
have abundant financial resources, though lacking the administrative capacity to apply 
cash transfer programs. 
3. Concerns regarding the unfortunate results on the poor 
A great amount of the benefits from energy subsidies might be taken by higher-
income groups, however, as it was previously noted, energy price rises can still have a 
crucial disadvantageous impact on the actual incomes of the poor. This is a significant 
concern for countries which lack a proper-functioning social security net that is able 
to efficiently protect the poor from the negative result of higher energy prices. 
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4. Concerns regarding the negative effect on inflation, global 
competitiveness, as well as volatility of domestic energy prices 
Rise in energy prices, will have short-lasting effects on inflation, which could arise 
expectations of additional rises in prices and wages unless suitable macroeconomic 
policies are present. This can particularly be a concern for countries which have a 
hard time securing inflation expectations. Higher energy prices can also cause worries 
concerning the international competitiveness of energy-intensive sectors. 
Furthermore, countries hesitate to liberalize energy prices for evading fluctuation in 
domestic prices emerging from global price progressions.  
5. Defiance from certain interest groups benefiting from the status quo  
Politically eloquent groups that benefit from subsidies can be dominant and well 
organized and can obstruct reforms. For instance, in a number of countries the urban 
middle class as well as the industrial sector can be a barrier to reform. On the 
contrary, those benefiting from reform are usually scattered and less organized; thus, 
reform plans need to address the concerns of the losers.  
6. Feeble macroeconomic circumstances  
Public resistance to subsidy reform is diminished when economic progress is 
comparably high and inflation is low- despite the fact that subsidy reform cannot 
always be adjourned and is usually necessary as part of attempts to contain inflation 
and stimulate evolution. Rising household incomes can assist households and manage 
in a better way the increases in energy prices required by subsidy reform.  
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6.4 Analytical Framework for phasing-out fossil fuel 
subsidies 
 
The World Bank has developed a roadmap for phasing-out fossil fuel subsidies which 
is included in the Joint Report of IEA, OECD and The World Bank [10]. The scope of 
this roadmap is to provide the countries with some guidelines for prioritizing the 
removal of fossil fuel subsidies. The analytical framework is presented through a step-
by-step decision tree [Figure 19].  
 
The first step for the reforming of fossil fuel subsidies is to recognize the subsidies 
which are inefficient and lead to wasteful consumption.  The process of identifying 
these subsidies, according to the World Bank, requires deep comprehension of the 
social and economical condition of each country, along with the impacts of subsidies 
on consumption. Individual countries by using this decision tree, have the capability 
to test whether a subsidy should be retained, redesigned or removed, focusing on the 
impact on the poor. 
 
Phase 1 and phase 2 of the decision tree below, take into consideration existing 
subsidies, helping policy makers distinguish the inefficient ones, considering 
simultaneously efficiency and equity issues. Phase 3 estimates the cost effectiveness 
of subsidy tools, in comparison with alternative sectoral instruments. It should also be 
accentuated that even in the cases of subsidies that passed all the previous tests, 
scrutiny, periodic reviews and monitoring is required. In phase 4 it is examined 
whether the subsidy is the most appropriate mechanism for addressing the needs of 
the poor and from a broader policy perspective, whether the same amount of money 
could be reallocated to other socially and environmentally wiser activities [10].   
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      Figure 19: Decision tree by IEA, OECD and The World Bank (2010) 
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7 Subsidy Reform Experiences 
This section outlines the level of fossil fuel subsidies in the largest subsidizers, along 
with their experiences in the path of reforming. The selected case studies include 
developing as well as developed countries, among the largest subsidizers: Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, India, China, Russia, U.S. and EU [Figure 20]. The data used are 
extracted from IEA’s and IMF’s recent estimates of energy subsidies. IMF’s estimates 
of pre- and post-tax subsidies cover both developed and developing countries. IEA, on 
the other hand, has no available data on developed countries and thus, these cases are 
covered only by IMF. 
 
7.1 MENA Region 
Almost half of the global energy subsidies (48%) are located in the MENA region 
[Clements et al.]. According to IEA [WEO, 2014], five of the top ten subsidizers 
worldwide, were in the MENA region. This substantially high level of subsidization is 
associated with high costs and inequities. Comparing expenditures in subsidizing 
fossil fuels (9% of GDP) and in food subsidies (1% of GDP), it is obvious how 
inefficient these subsidies are.  
The real problem with subsidies, as stated in [43], is that they are closely related to 
some of the major challenges facing the MENA region, such as slow growth, high 
unemployment, air pollution and water scarcity. The phase-out of these subsidies 
could result in alleviation of these problems and create a more balanced economy 
from every aspect.  
7.1.1 Iran  
According to IEA [WEO, 2014], Iran is the largest pre-tax subsidizer in the world, 
with USD 84 billion in 2013, accounting for more than 20% of its GDP (highest value 
worldwide). IMF’s estimates for post-tax subsidies were a little higher; up to USD 99 
billion [Figure 21] [19]. Among other countries in the MENA region, Iran first  
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Figure20: Map of world’s top subsidizers [IEA, 2014]
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introduced subsidy reforming plan, which aimed to equate domestic prices to 
international level over five years.  
 
 
 
 
                     Figure 21: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in Iran   [European Commission, 17]  
 
The initial phase of the plan included raise in the prices of petroleum products, NG 
and electricity. The biggest share of the savings was planned to be transformed into 
cash transfers to poor households, as compensation to the most vulnerable to the price 
changes. The government though, changed the initial plan and provided access to cash 
transfers to the whole population (USD 40-45 per person per month), making the 
system more equitable, while corrosive fossil fuel subsidies were eliminated. In the 
cases of poor households with low energy needs (no vehicles, not many appliances), 
such monthly transfers benefited them significantly [44, 45].  
Iran’s subsidy reform experience outlines the key role of a communication campaign 
in order to inform the public on the advantages of removing something so inefficient 
for the domestic economy. The next phase of the price increases was implemented in 
2014 (instead of 2012), due to the economic situation in the country (slow economic 
growth, high inflation). Prices of petroleum were increased by 75% and experienced a 
further raise in June 2015 [46]. The most encouraging part is that the public largely 
supported the reforms, despite the cumbersome domestic situation. In the second 
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phase, government targeted more effectively the cash transfers. The most recent 
updates state that government is searching for criteria to eliminate the monthly cash 
transfers [47].  
7.1.2 Saudi Arabia  
According to IEA [WEO, 2014], Saudi Arabia is the second largest pre-tax subsidizer 
in the world, with USD 62 billion in 2013. The share of oil subsidies is 75% and the 
rest is subsidies in electricity sector [Figure 22]. IMF’s post-tax subsidies are again 
estimated a little higher; up to USD 116 billion and are also dominated by petroleum 
[19].  
 
 
              Figure 22: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in Saudi Arabia [European Commission, 17] 
 
In Saudi Arabia domestic consumers pay fixed prices for energy products (diesel, 
gasoline, electricity), which equaled USD 0.16/liter for gasoline and USD 0.07/liter 
for diesel in 2015 November [48]. According to [IEA, 2014], these low prices inhibit 
investments in energy efficiency, i.e. more fuel-efficient cars,  since the payback 
period is very high; by removing these subsidies, the payback period of such 
investments will be reduced by more than 80% (from 16 to 3 years). Apart from 
subsidized fuels, investments in energy efficiency are also discouraged by subsidized 
electricity prices. The largest share of electricity consumption in Saudi Arabia (70%) 
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is due to air-conditioning and thus, subsidies of electricity prices lead to usage of 
inefficient air-conditioners. The removal of these subsidies could result in more 
efficient air-conditioners and substantial savings in electricity consumption [49].  
Although government has not yet proceeded in specifically reforming energy 
subsidies, some recent measures on setting minimum standards for energy efficiency, 
could be considered as the first steps. Getting prices closer to international levels, as 
stated in [17], would be a more effective way of guiding investment decisions, 
improving energy efficiency and finally achieving the subsidy reform goal.  
7.1.3 Egypt 
According to [IEA, 2014], Egypt was the eighth largest subsidizer, with consumption 
subsidies accounting for 12% of GDP or USD 32 billion [Figure 23]. Subsidies 
absorbed approximately 20% of public spending, exceeding expenditures on 
education, health and infrastructure combined. This high level of fossil fuel subsidies 
is closely related to the increased energy demand, which is considered a major 
challenge for Egypt’s government, since oil consumption surpassed production since 
2010 [50]. As World Bank estimated [51], a 50% reduction in energy subsidies 
combined with an equable distribution of the savings to the population could alleviate 
country’s poverty by 33%.  
 
                        Figure 23: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in Egypt [WEO, 2014] 
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Supported by IMF and the World Bank, Egyptian government has made significant 
effort in reforming fossil fuel subsidies, since it recognized their inefficiency in 
alleviating poverty and augmenting competitiveness. The first steps in reforming 
subsidies faced strong public opposition and thus, further attempts were put on hold. 
As stated in the [IEA, 2014], in July 2014 the Egyptian government announced 
significant reductions in subsidies for petrol, diesel, natural gas and electricity as an 
attempt to reduce the budget deficit of the country. In order to compensate low 
income households, new measures were introduced: minimum wage for public 
servants, increased pensions and subsidization of foods. Another ambition of the 
government was the sufficient pricing of refined products in order to achieve cost 
recovery in 5-7 years and to double electricity cost over 5 years, by using cross-
subsidization for the compensation of small consumers [52]. The savings of these 
reforms are expected to be USD 7 billion, of which USD 3 billion would be invested 
in health and education. In contrast with the earlier attempts, these reforms were 
accompanied by extensive communication efforts to inform the public for the benefits 
of phasing-out inefficient subsidies [47]. 
 
7.2 India  
Fossil fuel pre-tax subsidies in India follow the estimates of Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
accounting for USD 47 billion in 2013 [IEA, 2014]. These subsidies are split in 
petroleum and petroleum products, which cover the biggest share (78%), electricity 
(13%) and natural gas (9%) [Figure 24]. According to IMF, post-tax subsidies of 
petroleum products and coal both accounted for 2% of GDP; subsidies to electricity 
and natural gas were estimated at around 0.4% of GDP each [19]. 
Approximately 25% of India’s population lives below the poverty line and thus, in 
order to support this large number of poor households, India had traditionally 
significantly high levels of consumption subsidies. According to [53], 14% of the 
government budget was spent in fossil fuel subsidies, which points out how inefficient 
these subsidies are in alleviating energy poverty.  
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                   Figure 24: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in India [European Commission, 17] 
 
 
In 2010, the India government started reforming fossil fuel subsidies by liberalizing 
petroleum price [54]. This was followed by deregulation of diesel pricing in 2013-
which was delayed due to high food inflation; diesel was fully deregulated by October 
2014. As a result, India’s budget deficit is significantly eliminated.  
Despite this recent success, India has still a long way to go in phasing-out fossil fuel 
subsidies, since LPG, kerosene, electricity and gas subsidies remain high. Especially 
LPG subsidies are considered to be very regressive, since the majority goes to urban 
households and over 40% are captured by the richest [Whitley et al., 2015]. Kerosene 
subsidies, although they do benefit the poor (massively used for lighting), they 
support a fuel which is expensive, polluting and inefficient. In response to these 
problems, India’s Finance Minister announced in January 2015, a new plan for 
reforming LPG and kerosene subsidies, in combination with a taxation on petroleum 
and diesel. The expected results of these reforms are the dropping of the fiscal deficit 
from 5.5% of GDP in 2014-15 to 4.2% in 2015-16 [53]. 
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7.3 China 
 Pre-tax fossil fuel subsidies in China are ranked in the world’s 9th place, according to 
the [IEA, 2014], at the level of USD 21 billion in 2013. IMF’s estimates on post-tax 
basis are extremely higher, with subsidies of USD 353 billion, making China the 
world’s second largest post-tax subsidizer following United States [Figure 25]. 91% 
of this huge amount of post-tax subsidies is due to the externalities associated with 
coal, while pre-tax subsidies for coal have already been removed. These extensive 
externalities are explained by the fact that China consumes as much coal as the rest of 
the world combined [19].    
China has already introduce reform plans, in order to equate energy prices with 
international levels [55]. In 2007, the country made its first steps towards a market 
based pricing mechanism, since all price controls were reduced. In 2012 a three-tiered 
electricity pricing system was adopted for residential consumers depending on the 
level of consumption [56]. These changes affected only 20% of households, since 
increased electricity bills were observed only for the largest residential customers. 
Based on the fact that richer households had to pay more than the poor ones, subsidies 
to energy consumption could be characterized as more progressive and well targeted; 
their value fell from USD 11.8 billion in 2012 to USD 7.2 in 2013, as a result of the 
reforms [IEA, 2014]. 
 
 
 
 
               Figure 25: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in China   [European Commission, 17] 
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7.4 Russia 
In pre-tax basis Russia is the fourth largest subsidizer, according to [IEA, 2014], with 
USD 46,5 billion in 2013. In IMF’s post-tax estimates, Russia is the third largest 
subsidizer, following China, with USD 136 billion or 7.3% of GDP [Figure 26]. 
Subsidies in Russia are distributed between electricity and natural gas, since 
petroleum and coal subsidies were completely removed after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Thus, Russia is considered the largest electricity subsidizer and the world’s 
second largest natural gas subsidizer. Apart from consumption, production is also 
generously supported by the government, especially new developments in oil and gas 
fields.  
 Russia adopted a four-tiered pricing system for natural gas; Ganzprom – a state-
owned company for natural gas- sells natural gas in higher prices to industrial 
domestic consumers and in lower to residential consumers [57]. The prices for 
domestic consumers are below cost for Gazprom, which in turn balances its losses 
from the high exports’ profits of natural gas to the EU importers. These favorable 
conditions for Russian consumers are very costly for the government, since more than 
50% of Russia’s natural gas production is domestically consumed [57,58]. According 
to [59], in the past decade the Russian government allowed Gazprom to increase 
prices by 14-25% per year, but this kind of subsidy reforming efforts came to nothing 
due to the financial crisis and Russia’s economic problems.  
 
 
                     Figure 26: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in Russia [European Commission, 17] 
74 
 
7.5 The United States  
IMF’s estimates on post-tax basis are extremely high, with subsidies of USD 410 
billion, making U.S. the world’s largest post-tax subsidizer. Compared with post-tax 
subsidies, which sum up to 2.7% of GDP, pre-tax subsidies make less than 0.1% of 
GDP. 60% of these subsidies are for petroleum and petroleum products [Figure 27] 
[19]. 
The U.S. has the lowest gasoline and diesel prices from any other advanced economy 
(very low taxation) and this is the reason for petroleum’s dominance in post-tax 
subsidies. This very low taxation of transport fuels results in revenues which only 
cover expenditures on road infrastructure building and maintenance and nothing 
associated to the negative environmental and health effects. Apart from petroleum, the 
remaining share of total post-tax subsidies is split between coal (almost 30%) and 
natural gas (13%). Taxation of coal is not heavy enough to cover its negative 
externalities; taxation of natural gas is lower than coal or petroleum, since it is the 
cleanest fossil fuel [60].  
From the side of production, a noteworthy example of subsidy is the so-called “excess 
of percentage over cost depletion option” [17]. As stated in [IEA, 2010], this provides 
natural minerals companies with the right to subtract a high percentage of their gross 
income for depletion of their reserves.  Another example of production subsidization 
is associated with R&D activities, such as new technologies to exploit unconventional 
gas reserves, which played the key role in the shale gas boom in the U.S. From the 
side of consumption, no generalized subsidies exist in the U.S. In advanced 
economies, prices of energy products for domestic consumption are not fixed below 
international levels. Alternatively, the U.S. government is focusing in targeted transfer 
schemes which help the low income households with their energy associated costs, 
such as the LIHEAP (the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program) [60]. 
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             Figure 27: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in the United States [European Commission, 17]  
 
7.6 European Union  
The top subsidizers in the EU were Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy, according to 
[61]. On a pre-tax basis, fossil fuel subsidies in the EU are very low; less than USD 
10 billion or 0.1% of GDP. On a post-tax basis, IMF estimates are USD 89 billion, 
which is a very small share of global post-tax subsidies (up to 5%), taking into 
consideration that 20% of global GDP is produced by the EU [19]. This low level of 
post-tax subsidization is attributed to the low pre-tax subsidies and the heavy taxation 
of energy consumption in the EU, which equals lower tax subsidies compared with 
other countries. This is translated in taxation of energy consumption closer to efficient 
levels, since higher tax subsidies are associated with market failure of negative 
externalities. More than half of post-tax subsidies (approximately 60%) are associated 
with the production or consumption of coal, as its taxation is according to its negative 
externalities. Post-tax subsidies for natural gas account for more than 30%, while 
support to petroleum and petroleum products for the remaining 6%. According to 
[61], where subsidies for renewable energy were included, government interventions 
supporting renewable energy were higher than support to fossil fuels.  
The European Union is making significant effort in order to eliminate fossil fuel 
subsidies. Generalized subsidies have been phased out and low income households are 
assisted through targeted schemes and social safety nets [62]. The European 
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legislation agreed to phase-out subsidization of coal production from uncompetitive 
mines by the end of 2018. Efforts are being made in order to revise the EU energy 
taxation directive, where taxation of energy products is based on their energy content 
and CO2 emissions. This aims to provide incentives for more efficient use of resources 
and climate change mitigation. The introduction of minimum level of tax rates on 
energy and CO2 content in the EU countries is the most significant measure proposed 
[17].  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                   
                 Figure 28: Fossil Fuel Subsidies in the European Union [European Commission, 17] 
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8 Lessons Learned  
 
Based on the previous countries’ case studies, along with a larger number of countries 
collected by IEA and IMF, this section provides some lessons learned from these 
subsidy reform experiences.  
 
8.1 Initial Conditions 
A recent review by IMF [Sdralevich et. al.] points out the initial conditions that 
enhance subsidy reform: 
 Growth: Countries with high economic activity experienced more successful 
reforms compared to countries with lower growth levels. This result probably 
reflects a stronger resistance to additional economic losses.  
 Inflation and international commodity prices: It is observed in most of the 
cases of reforms that high level of initial inflation leads to less successful 
results. This could be attributed to limited tolerance for further decrease of 
incomes due to subsidy reform and to the relative challenges of promoting the 
reform to the public. 
 Public finances: Subsidy reforms could be more successful when they are 
considered as part of a fiscal strategy to eliminate fiscal deficits and free 
resources toward infrastructure and social spending (boost growth, reduce 
poverty and inequality).  
 Political conditions: When reforms were related to multiparty governments, 
this resulted in more successful reform experiences. According to [OECD, 
2009], under a minority government, reversal of reforms is less likely to occur, 
because, although more negotiation is needed, their implementation requires 
the support of the opposition. 
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8.2 Designing a successful subsidy reform 
IEA in its World Energy Outlook [IEA, 2014] outlined some guidelines obtained 
from subsidy reform experiences and developed an effective approach for successful 
practices. Figure 29 summarizes all the critical steps of a reform process.  
                     
 
 
                       Figure 29: Successful Reform process [WEO, 2014] 
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8.2.1 Demonstrating the goal of reform 
The essential objective of government policies to reform fossil-fuel subsidies is to get 
prices right, i.e. ensure that energy prices reflect their true economic value. This must 
involve letting the market determine pre-tax prices freely, ensuring that a competitive 
market, once created, works efficiently; and identifying and unraveling all other forms 
of government intervention that cannot be economically justified, where they have the 
effect of lowering fuel prices to consumers or the cost of production, or raising the 
price received by producers. Competition, by incentivizing investment in new supply 
infrastructure and encouraging efficiency, is a far more cost-effective way of lowering 
energy costs than fuel subsidies. As part of the overall process, the government has to 
consider the appropriate level of tax that should be applied to the fuel to reflect 
economic, social and environmental externalities, taking account of the need to raise 
tax revenues [IEA, 2014].  
There are rarely good economic or social grounds for subsidizing any fossil fuel 
directly, whether to consumers or producers. There may be legitimate concerns about 
the burden of energy costs on the poorest portions of the community, but, in general, 
social goals are best served by direct welfare payments to households and the 
provision of public services, such as health, education and social protection schemes, 
rather than fuel subsidies. Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, there will be a case 
for direct intervention in energy markets, for example to make energy available and 
more affordable for poor households. Where this is the case, it may make sense to 
apply the subsidy to the purchase of related equipment or services, such as an LPG 
cook stove, energy-efficient equipment or building insulation. Electricity may be seen 
as a special case, as access to it is essential to alleviate dire poverty and improve 
living standards; there may well be justification for subsidizing access by applying a 
social, or lifeline, tariff for the an initial small tranche of consumption – a common 
and widely accepted form of subsidy – though it may be difficult to limit this subsidy 
to poor households [IEA, 2014]. 
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8.2.2 Implementation of market reforms 
In most cases, it is inadvisable to introduce market pricing of fossil fuels too abruptly, 
considering that this would typically lead to a sudden and possibly sharp rise in 
prices, as well as short-term price volatility. A practical approach, which can assist in 
the transition to full market pricing, is to introduce a formula-based automatic pricing 
mechanism that ensures that retail prices reflect movements in international prices. 
Such a mechanism can be applied progressively, such that prices rise in a step-fashion 
towards full market levels. This is particularly sensible where prices need to be raised 
several‐fold to reach market levels: one-off, very big hikes in prices generally prove 
too disruptive and provoke a public outcry [IEA, 2014]. As prices rise towards market 
levels, the frequency of price adjustments can be increased so that consumers 
gradually get used to the frequent small price movements likely to be experienced in a 
competitive market. This approach has the advantage of being fully transparent and, 
eventually, distancing the government from individual changes in prices, helping to 
depoliticize energy price-setting. 
The process of subsidy reform has to go hand-in-hand with proactive measures to 
restructure the energy sector to enable competition to take hold. This may require to 
break up dominant companies (usually state-owned), mandating third‐party access to 
infrastructure and other steps to facilitate the entry into the sector of new players 
[Clements et al.]. Clear regulations on competition need to be drawn up and 
enforced. Once retail prices have risen to international levels and the domestic market 
has been restructured in a way that allows for effective competition in wholesale and 
retail supply, the government can abandon the administered pricing mechanism and 
allow the market to determine prices freely. It is easier to gauge the degree of price 
competition if the government is setting price ceilings rather than fixing price levels; 
prices that fall below price ceilings and that vary between companies are signs of 
emerging competition [64]. Once competition is established and prices are 
deregulated, the government’s only role in price-setting is to monitor how the market 
is operating to ensure that competition is effective. In parallel with the move towards 
market pricing, all other sources of subsidy to fossil fuels need to be identified and 
removed, alongside fiscal reform aimed at achieving a rational structure of taxes. 
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8.2.3 Addressing the impacts of subsidy reform 
It is evident that it can be very difficult to reform subsidies in the face of hostility 
from those who benefit from them. By its very nature, the costs of an energy subsidy 
are spread broadly throughout the economy, while most of its benefits are often 
enjoyed by only a small segment of the population. The beneficiaries will always have 
an interest in defending that subsidy when their gains exceed their share of the 
economic and environmental costs. The longer the subsidies have existed, the more 
entrenched the opposition to reduce them tends to be – especially if they have led 
consumers to adopt energy-intensive technologies and practices over a prolonged 
period [ΙΕΑ, 2014].  
Resistance to subsidy reform is understandable where the beneficiaries of the 
subsidies stand to suffer real hardship. That is why reforms need to be managed in 
such a way as to reduce or offset the negative consequences for those groups of 
consumers that stand to lose out, especially the poor. The first step is to identify and 
measure the likely effects of reform. Only then can the need to compensate affected 
groups be assessed and appropriate measures devised. It is generally advisable to 
involve representatives of the affected groups in this work in order to benefit from 
their knowledge and experience, to ensure that the compensatory measures respond 
adequately to their concerns, and to raise awareness and gain support for the reform 
and the accompanying measures. Putting cash in the hands of consumers through 
conditional payments as an alternative to blanket subsidies can offer major benefits 
[ΙΕΑ, 2014]:  
i. it allows for better targeting to those that need it the most, making sure the 
benefits are not skewed towards the richest; 
ii. it puts the decision-making in the hands of the consumer, and can thereby 
encourage more efficient energy use;  
iii. with extra money (not being spent on energy because this is consumed more 
efficiently), consumer spending or saving will be boosted, which in either 
case, will be a boon to the economy. 
In some cases, the need for social and economic support, such as conditional cash-
transfers, might only be temporary, to help consumers or producers get over the initial 
shock of subsidy removal. Where more permanent support is justified, measures are 
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likely to involve strengthening social safety nets, improved provision of health and 
education, and direct welfare payments to the poor and vulnerable – a generally much 
more efficient and cost-effective way of providing assistance to those groups than 
fossil-fuel subsidies. The precise mix of measures adopted will usually reflect a 
mixture of what is practical, consumer or producer preferences and what is politically 
feasible [65]. Once in place, the effectiveness of those measures needs to be carefully 
monitored and evaluated. 
8.2.4 Communicating reform benefits 
Effective communication of the benefits of reforming fossil-fuel subsidies is critical 
to building broad support and countering resistance from vested interests. This can be 
difficult in practice. Politicians often struggle to explain in a comprehensible way the 
economic costs of a subsidy and the gains that can be had from eliminating it. In oil-
exporting countries, the task of persuading the public that oil products should be sold 
at their opportunity cost and not their cost of production can be particularly hard – all 
the more so when the spoils from exploiting oil resources are not otherwise shared by 
the population at large. In many resource-rich countries, cheap fuels are often 
considered an integral part of the social contract between the government and its 
citizens. In some cases, the public is likely to be unconvinced by government 
promises to redirect spending to other public goods and services [IEA, 2014].  
Subsidy reform can have far-reaching effects and so a consultation and 
communication strategy needs to be co-ordinated across all relevant government 
agencies. Planning careful communication strategies including media and public 
campaigns in order to reach out to the poor and those who will be most affected by 
the subsidy reform can help minimize public opposition [65]. Good communication 
must be based on listening, so consultation with all interested parties – through public 
inquiries, discussion groups, surveys and workshops – is vital.  
Communication needs to take the form of simple messages, targeted at specific 
groups of energy users and using appropriate media, including radio, television, 
public speeches and announcements, debates, advertisements and web-based 
communications [65]. Honesty and openness are critical to a successful 
communications strategy [Clements et al., 2013]: the messages must be honest and 
clear, focusing on central aspects of the need for reform. They need to include the 
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magnitude of the cost under‐recoveries by energy companies and the compensatory 
financial payments by the government; how the subsidies are captured by different 
income groups and the effects of reform on them; the non-fiscal costs of subsidies 
such as smuggling, fuel diversion, fuel shortages and deteriorating infrastructure; and 
an exposition of how social and economic goals can be better met using alternatives to 
subsidies.  
Finally, another important ingredient for a successful communications strategy 
involves strengthening transparency in monitoring and reporting subsidies in the 
budget. Transparency should precede reforming, in order to allow governments to 
develop motivation for subsidy reform [Clements et al., 2013]. Figure 30 depicts the 
levels of transparency of several regions and makes clear that the regions which have 
the greatest share of inefficient subsidies are the less transparent ones. 
 
 
 
                   Figure 30: Global Transparency levels [Open Budget Survey, 2015] 
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9 Conclusions 
 
In this final chapter, the derived conclusions of the dissertation are being summarized. 
The scope of the dissertation is to point out the main features of energy subsidies, 
their impacts on economy, society and the environment, combined with the need for 
their reform.  
The first chapters include the definitions and measurement of energy subsidies. There 
is no common definition of a subsidy; several definitions are provided by different 
international organizations (IEA, OECD, IMF, WTO). The most frequent 
categorization of energy subsidies is between producer and consumer subsidies and 
whether they promote conventional or renewable forms of energy. Subsidies can be 
further categorized into direct transfers, such as grants to producers, or indirect 
transfers, such as tax reductions, favorable loans and R&D activities.  
Despite the fact that subsidies are widespread, they have considerable variations in 
type and significance across different fuels, regions and time, which makes not only 
definition, but also measurement of energy subsidies, very difficult. The most widely 
used way of measuring energy subsidies is the price-gap approach; subsidies are 
estimated as the difference between an international reference price and the price paid 
by end-users. A further distinction between consumption subsidies, made by IMF, is 
pre-tax and post-tax consumption subsidies. Pre-tax subsidies are defined as the 
difference between a benchmark price and the price paid by the consumer. In the case 
of post-tax subsidies, the benchmark price equals the supply costs plus a tax subsidy, 
which reflects the negative externalities associated with social and environmental 
adverse effects.  
By observing the global picture of fossil fuel subsidies, the following conclusions are 
drawn: the estimation of consumption subsidies by the IEA in 2013 was US$548 
billion, out of which, petroleum products accounted for more than 50%, whereas the 
estimation of post-tax subsidies by IMF in the same year, was a lot higher at the level 
of USD$4.9 trillion, mainly due to the associated negative externalities. 
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Concerning subsidies of renewable energy, different schemes exist in order to support 
cleaner and more efficient technologies, such as Feed-in tariffs (FiT), which guarantee 
a fixed price per MWh produced, Feed-in premium (FiP), which serve as capacity 
payments to the generators and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) or otherwise 
tradable green certificates (TGCs). The estimated global subsidies for RES were 
USD121 billion in 2013, a level significantly lower than this of fossil fuels.  
The heavy subsidization of fossil fuels worldwide has serious negative effects, mainly 
due to the fact that inefficient subsidies overshadow any economic, social and 
environmental benefit that could possibly arise from them. From an economic point of 
view, such huge levels of governmental support result in higher budget deficit, while 
from the side of society, they lead to less funds spent in education and health and also 
in promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency, considering the environmental 
aspect of the issue. 
Thus, governments realized the urgency of reforming these harmful subsidies. 
Subsidies, once in place, are extremely difficult to remove. There are several 
obstacles that have to be overcome, such as the lack of government reliability, 
concerns regarding the volatility of domestic prices and the negative effects on the 
poor. Several countries have made efforts in order to reform their corrosive subsidies; 
in this dissertation, the reform experiences of some of the largest subsidizers globally 
are presented. Although a formula for success does not exist, since country 
circumstances and global conditions are changing, these experiences point out some 
critical steps for increasing the potential of successful subsidy reform and transition 
from subsidized to stronger and competitive markets: 
 In most successful reforms, a reform strategic plan was established. This 
plan requires setting of long-term objectives, consultation with 
stakeholders and assessing the impact of reforms.  
 During the reform process, a well-planned communications campaign is 
vital for generating political and public support. The purpose of such a 
campaign is to make the public aware of the cost of subsidies, as well as 
the benefits of reforming,   
 A sudden and sharp increase in energy prices can lead to opposition to 
reforms, especially in the cases which lack sufficient communication or 
mitigating measures. By introducing price increases and sequencing them 
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differently across energy products, the above mentioned opposition may be 
avoided. This kind of strategy is able to provide governments with the 
necessary time to develop social safety nets and allow households and 
companies to adapt.  
 The development of public support for subsidy reforms is a very 
demanding procedure. The most essential step is to establish targeted 
measures in order to mitigate the impacts of reforms to the poor. 
Governments must take care, with high priority, of the most vulnerable to 
the removal of energy subsidies and compensate them from the initiation 
of the reform plan through more targeted social protection. 
 In order to set energy prices effectively, a depoliticized and rules-based 
mechanism is required. This can lead to successful and durable reforms 
with less chances of reversal. A solution for achieving a sustained energy 
subsidies reform is the adoption of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism, 
which could be accompanied by a smoothing feature to avoid domestic 
fuel price volatility.  
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